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1467 
CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION IN JAPAN: 
CONTEXT, STRUCTURES, AND VALUES 
JOHN O. HALEY

 
Judicial decision making in Japan has become a topic of considerable 
interest for at least the cadre of comparative lawyers whose primary 
concern is constitutional law. Such interest is to be applauded. 
Comparisons with Japan are always beneficial, in that they require a 
departure from the prevailing focus on the United States and Western 
Europe. Broadening the scope of comparison to include Japan, the premier 
non-Western industrial democracy for over a century, avoids at least some 
of the significant pitfalls of Eurocentric analyses that too often tend to 
mislead as much as to edify. The inclusion of Japan in comparative legal 
analyses forces explicit recognition of assumptions and premises related to 
legal systems that are frequently left unstated and merely, mistakenly, 
assumed as universally valid. Japan‘s inclusion thus leads to a more 
complete and arguably more accurate appraisal of factors and issues that 
should be included but might otherwise be ignored.  
Many, if not most, accounts of decision making by courts in Japan—
especially in cases involving constitutional questions—describe the 
outcomes as ―conservative‖ and so label the judiciary.1 The most 
frequently noted support for such conclusions is the relative dearth of 
cases in which the Japanese courts have held legislative and other state 
actions to be unconstitutional.
2
 Rarely if ever do critics engage in any in-
depth comparative analysis of constitutional cases and their context in 
other industrial democracies. The relative paucity of decisions invalidating 
legislation and other state actions as unconstitutional has been the 
principal, if not exclusive, point of departure in attempts to explain the 
now apparent ―conservatism‖ or, indeed, the proclivity of judges, 
particularly the fifteen Justices who occupy the bench of the Supreme 
 
 
  Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School; William R. Orthwein Distinguished 
Professor of Law Emeritus, Washington University in St. Louis. 
 1. See, e.g., HIROSHI ITOH, THE JAPANESE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITUTIONAL POLICIES 
(1989); id. at 221–47 (chapter six entitled ―The Conservative Supreme Court,‖ in which Itoh offers an 
insightful analysis of judicial decision making by the Supreme Court).  
 2. See, e.g., HIROYUKI HATA & GO NAKAGAWA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF JAPAN 78 (1997); 
David S. Law, The Anatomy of a Conservative Court: Judicial Review in Japan, 87 TEX. L. REV. 1545 
(2009); Percy R. Luney, Jr., The Judiciary, in JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 145 (P.R. Luney, Jr. 
& Kazuyuki Takahashi eds., 1993). 
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Court, to defer to the political and administrative branches of government. 
I disagree.  
I do not take issue with the ultimate conclusion that judges in Japan are 
―conservative.‖ Indeed, I have previously described the judiciary in similar 
terms.
3
 My quibble is with the meanings given the terms and the 
explanations of the cases and their outcomes. In other words, I question 
the prevailing—or at least the most widely disseminated and influential—
analyses of judicial decision making in Japan. The assertion that Japanese 
judges in constitutional cases are more likely than their counterparts in the 
United States or Western Europe to defer to the legislature or to 
administrative agencies requires painstaking comparative analyses of the 
outcomes of like cases—instances in which career judges and Justices in 
Japan have refused to invalidate legislation or administrative actions that 
have or would have been deemed unconstitutional in the United States and 
Western Europe. Citing mere numbers does not suffice. A threshold 
problem, as explained below, is that there are few, if any, truly like cases. 
A principal aim in this essay is to show why this is so and, in so doing, 
why invalidation of legislation or administrative regulations on 
constitutional grounds has been relatively rare in Japan. In the process, I 
hope to add some additional thoughts to the discussion of constitutional 
adjudication in Japan.  
The starting point for any comparative study of constitutional 
adjudication must be the constitutions themselves. Differences in 
constitutional provisions—particularly constitutional guarantees and 
protections of individual rights—must first be taken into account. Three 
provisions of the Japanese Constitution well illustrate this point. The first 
is the freedom of occupation guarantee of Article 22, which provides that 
―Every person shall have freedom . . . to choose his occupation to the 
extent that it does not interfere with the public welfare.‖ 
The provision is a German law borrowing from the ―freedom of 
occupation‖ (berufsfreiheit) provisions of articles 111(1) and 151(3) in the 
Weimar Constitution, currently incorporated in article 12(1) of the 1949 
Bonn Basic Law. It was included, despite the lack of any U.S. counterpart, 
in the draft of the steering committee, chaired by Charles L. Kades and 
delegated by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Occupation (SCAP), 
that was charged with writing a ―model‖ constitution for postwar Japan. A 
second provision, which not only has no U.S. parallel but was initially 
rejected by Kades and later inserted as an amendment during Diet 
 
 
 3. See JOHN OWEN HALEY, THE SPIRIT OF JAPANESE LAW 90–122 (1998). 
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deliberations,
4
 is Article 17, which provides: ―Any person who has been 
injured [damaged] by a delict [tortious act] of a public official shall be 
able to claim compensatory damages from the state or a public entity as 
provided by law.‖5 
Equally significant for comparative purposes, no industrial democracy 
has any equivalent to Article 9 of the postwar Constitution, which 
provides:  
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and 
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right 
of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling 
international disputes. 2) In order to accomplish the aim of the 
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war 
potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the 
state will not be recognized. 
Personally drafted by Kades, the provision as enacted includes 
prefatory language added during the deliberations in the Diet.
6
 Over the 
past six decades, hardly any constitutional provision has been as 
contentious or subject to as many judicial decisions. The constitutionality 
of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, of U.S. bases in Japan, and of the Self-
Defense forces have been among the most frequently litigated 
constitutional issues of postwar Japan.  
Routinely ignored by Western critics of the ―conservatism‖ of the 
judiciary are cases in which at least the first two of these provisions have 
been applied. The first is the Pharmacy case,
7
 in which the Court in 
effect—but without explicit acknowledgement—overruled a 1955 Grand 
Bench decision in the so-called Bathhouse case.
8
 The 1975 decision 
invalidated a licensing standard for the location of a pharmacy as an 
 
 
 4. For a more detailed discussion, see John O. Haley, Toward a Reappraisal of the Occupation 
Legal Reforms: Administrative Accountability, in EIBEIHÔ RONSHÛ (ESSAYS ON ANGLO-AMERICAN 
LAW) (Hideo Tanaka Festschrift) 543, 550 (Fujikura K. ed., 1987). 
 5. This text constitutes the author‘s own translation of the constitutional provision. 
 6. Interview with Charles L. Kades & John O. Haley, Henry M. Jackson Sch. of Int‘l Studies, 
World Focus: Making of the Japanese Constitution Part I (May 23, 1989) (transcript of taped interview 
on file with author); see also John O. Haley, Waging War: Japan's Constitutional Restraints, 14 
CONSTITUTIONAL FORUM CONSTITUTIONNEL, no. 2, 2005, at 18. 
 7. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 30, 1975, Showa 50 no. 665, SAIBANSHO JIHŌ (K.K. 
Sumiyoshi v. Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture); see also John O. Haley, Comment: The Freedom to 
Choose an Occupation and the Constitutional Limit of Legislative Discretion—K.K. Sumiyoshi v. 
Governor of Hiroshima Prefecture, 8 LAW IN JAPAN: AN ANNUAL 178 (1975). 
 8. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 26, 1955, 9 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 89 
(Shimizu v. Japan, or the ―Bathhouse‖ case), translated in JOHN M. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION 
IN JAPAN 293 (1964).  
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infringement on the ―freedom of occupation‖ of Article 22. A more recent 
case is the Grand Bench 2002 decision in Nanafuku Sangyō K.K. v. 
Japan,
9
 in which the Court unanimously held unconstitutional provisions 
of the Postal Services Law exempting or limiting the tort liability of the 
state for registered mail where a loss has occurred as a result of the 
intentional acts or gross negligence of a postal worker.
10
 The decisions in 
both cases serve as telling reminders that the Court has reached decisions 
that are considerably more classically ―liberal‖ or ―libertarian‖ than those 
by its U.S. counterpart.
11
 Discussed below are the Article 9 cases on which 
much of the commentary regarding the ―conservatism‖ of the courts 
hangs.  
In addition to such substantive constitutional differences, three clusters 
of fundamental factors, in my view, best explain national contrasts in 
constitutional adjudication. The first and broadest is historical context. 
Societal differences in historically evolved, broadly shared values and 
beliefs surely account for the dearth of state regulation—much less 
constitutional cases—in Japan (and East Asia in general) on abortion and 
in the West on enhanced penalties for crimes against lineal ascendants.
12
 
Fundamental differences in historical experience—particularly violent 
social and political conflict—since at least the sixteenth century, have 
created equally profound differences between Japan and the West with 
respect to the nature and extent of contentious contemporary social and 
political issues. Not since the sixteenth century has Japan experienced 
anything akin to the social and political strife that engulfed Western 
Europe from the late eighteenth century through the mid-twentieth 
century. Nor has Japan ever experienced chattel slavery. Many of the 
 
 
 9. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 11, 2002, 56 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ 
[MINSHŪ] 1439. 
 10. In the United States, such suits would be dismissed on the basis of sovereign immunity and 
debilitating construction of the Federal Torts Claims Act. See, e.g., Dolan v. U.S. Postal Serv., 546 
U.S. 481 (2006). 
 11. With respect to occupational licensing restrictions, see, for example, Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 
U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); and United States v. 
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). For a recent and more comparable case, see Craigmiles v. Giles, 
312 F.3d 220 (6th Cir. 2002). Statutes restricting the liability of the state for damages for a postal 
worker‘s intentional or gross negligence would undoubtedly be upheld. Indeed, such statutes are 
unnecessary. Suits claiming such liability would be easily dismissed on the basis of sovereign 
immunity and debilitating construction of the Federal Torts Claims Act. See, e.g., Dolan, 546 U.S. 
481. 
 12. See, e.g., Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 4, 1973, Showa 48 [keishū], 27 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
KEIJI HANREISHU [KEISHŪ] 265 (Aizawa v. Japan) (one of three cases decided together, holding 
unconstitutional the provision of Article 200 of the Criminal Code for aggravated penalties for the 
crime of the murder of a lineal ascendant).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/4
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constitutional issues adjudicated in contemporary Europe and the United 
States reflect the legacy of these conflicts and their underlying causes. 
Distinctive features of Japan‘s historical experience also explain the 
relative lack of a widely shared belief among the Japanese in universally 
applicable moral imperatives. The East Asian legal traditions never 
developed a notion of ―natural law‖ or a notional nexus between law and 
morality. The word seigi in Japanese (as well as Chinese and Korean), 
translated into English as ―justice,‖ has no legal meaning or connotation in 
its historical context. Nor, as a European legal transplant, has natural law 
theory held much sway in Japan. In political discourse, contested social 
and political issues from property rights to human rights are rarely if ever 
cast in terms of overlapping moral and legal imperatives. Instead of any 
shared belief in universally applicable, transcendental absolutes, Japan is 
notable for its distinctively contextual communitarian orientation and 
emphasis on consensus as a shared social value. Community norms, not 
transcendental norms, are what matters.
13
 These cultural attributes are, as 
indicated below, particularly significant in an analysis of judicial decision 
making. 
In addition, unless we are willing to challenge the efficacy of the 
democratic political structures of postwar Japan, we surely must concede 
that the Japanese people overwhelmingly favor center-right political 
policies. Center-right political parties (and party factions) have governed 
Japan almost continuously during the six-and-a-half decades since World 
War II. The only arguable exception was the ill-fated Katayama Cabinet, 
formed in 1948, that remained in office for only six months. Judges whose 
political inclinations lie well to the left of center are necessarily relatively 
few in number, unless, of course, one surmises (tacitly) that elites in 
Japan, including judges, are likely to be more ideologically to the left than 
the mainstream. Personally, I question such an assumption and tend to 
attribute it again to a Eurocentric projection of majoritarian governance 
onto Japan—a projection that emphasizes the role of constitutional courts 
in protecting minority interests and ―rights‖ that have been sacrificed or 
denied in the process.  
Many of the most contentious constitutional issues of post–World War 
II Japan simply have no counterpart in other industrial democracies. The 
war itself constituted the single most significant upheaval of modern 
Japanese history. Unlike Europe or the United States, Japan had never 
 
 
 13. For a fuller explanation of each of these features of historical context, see JOHN OWEN 
HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX (1991). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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before experienced ―total‖ war or foreign conquest. Unlike Europe, World 
War II was not a more devastating continuation of the Great War. Nor has 
Japan ever experienced an internal total war on the scale of the Civil War 
in the United States. The devastation of World War II helps to explain 
why the issue of a military establishment in Japan—either foreign or 
native—remains one of the two dominant constitutional issues of the 
postwar era.  
Since 1947, Japanese courts have adjudicated at least two dozen cases 
related to the constitutionality of various measures under Article 9. They 
have included direct challenges to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the 
presence of U.S. military bases, and the Self-Defense Forces. The 
Supreme Court has decided at least seven on appeal. Not included in this 
count are the closely related establishment and freedom of religion cases 
involving war memorials, the Yasukuni Shrine, as well as other Gokoku 
(Protect-the-Nation) shrines with historical ties to the military. The 
Court‘s decision in the Sunakawa case14 remains to date the principal 
Grand Bench decision on Article 9. There are only two other Grand Bench 
decisions on Article 9, both of which reaffirmed Sunakawa as precedent.
15
 
All three decisions involved the constitutionality of the U.S.-Japan 
security arrangements and the maintenance of U.S. military bases in 
Japan.
16
  
Despite multiple supplementary opinions in Sunakawa, all fifteen 
Justices agreed that, under Article 9, Japan retained a fundamental right of 
self-defense and could enter treaties for mutual security. Equally 
significant, the decision established the extant parameters for judicial 
review and the scope of legislative and administrative discretion. Except in 
the event of a ―clear‖ and unmistakable violation of Article 9, the courts 
are to defer to the judgment of the Diet and the Cabinet. Left to the courts, 
however, is the ultimate determination of such a manifest violation. 
Needless to say, the Court‘s stance has pleased neither pacifists on the left 
nor those on the right who favor a more active and prominent military 
establishment. The Court has thus managed to remain close to the center 
of the controversy and to express what appears to be the preference of the 
vast majority of Japanese—that the courts, not the political branches 
 
 
 14. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 16, 1959, Showa 34(A) no. 710, 13 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI 
HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 3225 (Sakata v. Japan). 
 15. See Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Aug. 28, 1996, Heisei 8 [gyo-tsu] no. 90, 50 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1952 (Ota v. Hashimoto); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 
1969, Showa 44, 23 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 1952 (Japan v. Sakane).  
 16. For a fuller discussion of these cases and other Article 9 decisions, see Haley, supra note 6, 
at 23. 
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(much less a military establishment), ultimately have the last word. Like 
an ace of trumps yet to be played, recognition that the Court has the 
winning hand and thus the ultimate say helps to explain why amendment 
of Article 9 has continuously been such a contentious issue. If, as some 
apparently believe, the Court‘s decisions have rendered Article 9 
meaningless and thereby leave the legislature with unlimited discretion to 
do what it wishes, why do so many Japanese so ardently defend Article 9 
against its critics, and why do so many of its critics who wish to see Japan 
play a more active military role in Asia and the world so ardently seek its 
revision? My answer is that Article 9 functions as both an effective 
political and at least potential judicial constraint on legislative discretion.  
More complex are the series of cases that ostensibly relate to the 
separation of religion and the state, and the guarantee of freedom of 
worship. Comparable cases on both the establishment and freedom of 
religion, at least between Japan and the United States, do exist. Japan‘s 
Supreme Court has decided at least two Jehovah‘s Witness cases that 
parallel U.S. Supreme Court decisions. Neither case supports the claim 
that, in like cases, the Japanese Supreme Court is more conservative than 
its U.S. or European counterparts. One involved a technical college 
student who had been held back for two years and then denied graduation 
for having refused on religious grounds to participate in compulsory kendo 
(Japanese sword) practice.
17
 The Second Petty Bench unanimously upheld 
the student‘s claim, stating that the school‘s decisions should be judged as 
―lacking in appropriateness compared with the view commonly accepted 
in society [shakai tsūnen] and . . . illegal beyond the scope of discretionary 
authority.‖18 In the second, another tort case, the Third Petty Bench 
unanimously found in favor of the plaintiff, Misae Takeda, also a 
Jehovah‘s Witness, in her claim for damages against physicians who, 
knowing of her religious objections to blood transfusions, failed to explain 
that they might give her a blood transfusion during the operation if they 
deemed it necessary, thus depriving her of the right to decide whether to 
accept or reject the blood transfusion.
19
 Critics of the ―conservative‖ 
judiciary rarely, if ever, cite these cases, which are hardly distinguishable 
 
 
 17. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 3, 1996, Heisei 7 [gyo-tsu] no. 74, 50 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 469 (Kobayashi v. Kobe Mun. Indus. Technical Coll.). 
 18. Id., translated in Judgments of the Supreme Court, COURTS IN JAPAN, http://www.courts. 
go.jp/english/judgments/text/1996.3.8-1995.-Gyo-Tsu-.No..74.html (English Translation of Section 4 
(Summary)) (last visited May 10, 2011). 
 19. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 29, 2009, Heisei 10(0) no. 1081–1082, 54 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 582 (Hosokawa v. Takeda). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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from their U.S. counterparts.
20
 Rather, they point to cases that are 
inexorably entwined with World War II.  
The leading decision on Japan‘s establishment clauses, prohibiting 
state support of religion as well as ―any religious acts‖ by the state (Art. 
20(1) and (3)), is the 1977 Grand Bench decision in the Tsu City Ground-
Purification Ceremony case.
21
 In the decision, reversing a 1971 Nagoya 
High Court decision, the Court by a ten-to-five majority upheld the 
constitutionality of a municipal expenditure for Shinto priests to perform a 
purification ritual as part of a ground-breaking ceremony for the 
construction of a public gymnasium. The majority viewed the ceremony as 
more of a folk ritual than a religious activity: 
[A]lthough the groundbreaking ceremonies (known as jichinsai, 
among other names) that are traditionally performed at the start of 
construction work to pray for a stable foundation and workers' 
safety had religious origins in their intent to pacify the gods of the 
land, there can be no doubt that this religious significance has 
gradually waned over time. In general, although the ceremony 
includes prayer for safety and a firm foundation at the start of 
construction, the proceedings have become a formality perceived as 
almost completely devoid of religious meaning. Even if the 
ceremony is performed in the style of an existing religion, as long as 
it remains within the bounds of well-established and widely 
practiced usage, most people would perceive it as a secularized 
ritual without religious meaning, a social formality that has become 
customary at the start of construction work.
22
 
While the Tsu City Ground-Purification Ceremony case is admittedly 
―conservative‖ in outcome, it is hardly more so than U.S. decisions such as 
Lynch v. Donnelly,
23
 which allowed a Christmas crèche to be included as 
part of a municipally sponsored Christmas display, or Marsh v. 
Chambers,
24
 which upheld the constitutionality of state-paid, legislative 
chaplains. Indeed, the Court‘s rationale that the Shinto ceremony was 
generally perceived as ―a secularized ritual without religious meaning‖ is 
 
 
 20. See, e.g., Stamford Hosp. v. Vega, 674 A.2d 821 (Conn. 1996) (upholding the right of a 
Jehovah‘s Witness to refuse a blood transfusion).  
 21. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 13, 1977, Showa 46 [gyo-tsu] no. 69, 31 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 533 (Kakunaga v. Sekiguchi). 
 22. Id., translated in Judgments of the Supreme Court, COURTS IN JAPAN, http://www.courts. 
go.jp/english/judgments/text/1977.7.13-1971.-Gyo-Tsu-.No..69.html (last visited May 10, 2011). 
 23. 465 U.S. 668 (1984). 
 24. 463 U.S. 783 (1983). 
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echoed by Chief Justice Burger, writing for the five-Justice majority in 
both Lynch and Marsh.  
Not comparable, however, are the religious establishment and freedom 
cases involving government-sponsored or government-supported war 
memorials and official visits and contributions to the national Yasukuni 
shrine, as well as prefectural gokoku shrines.
25
 In an equally landmark 
decision, in 1997, a thirteen-to-two majority of the Supreme Court held 
that contributions by a prefectural governor from public funds to the 
national Yasukuni shrine, as well as the affiliated prefectural gokoku 
shrine, violated Article 20(3) of the Constitution.
26
 In the 1988 Self-
Defense Force Officer Enshrinement case, another well-known Grand 
Bench decision, the Court dismissed the constitutional claims of a 
Christian widow of a Ground Self-Defense Force lieutenant that 
―deification‖ or enshrinement by the Yamaguchi Gokoku Shrine at the 
request of the local SDF Friendship Association—both of which were 
admittedly private organizations—violated the Article 20 prohibition of 
state involvement in religion and guarantee of religious freedom.
27
 
Minimizing evidence of official SDF involvement, the Court rejected the 
widow‘s claims for lack of state action.28 In 1993, the Third Petty Bench 
similarly ruled that the provision of land for a Shinto chūkonhi war 
memorial did not constitute an unconstitutional involvement with religion. 
In the words of the opinion, the memorial is  
basically recognized as a monument in memory of the war dead, the 
primal object of the association of the bereaved families of the war 
dead is not religious activity, and the head participated in memorial 
services with exclusive intention of conforming to common 
courtesy for the bereaved families of the war dead.
29
  
 
 
 25. For an excellent study of the principal cases of this genre through 1995, see DAVID M. 
O‘BRIEN WITH YASUO OHKOSHI, TO DREAM OF DREAMS: RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN POSTWAR JAPAN (1996).  
 26. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 2, 1997, 51 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1673 (Anzai v. Shiraishi). 
 27. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 1, 1998, 42 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
277 (Japan v. Nakaya). 
 28. The lieutenant‘s presumably non-Christian parents, it might be noted, favored the 
enshrinement. 
 29. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 1, 1998, 42 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
277 (Japan v. Nakaya), translated in Judgments of the Supreme Court, COURTS IN JAPAN, 
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/1993.2.16-1987-Gyo-Tsu-.No.148.html (last visited 
May 10, 2011). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Any visitor to a national cemetery in the United States today might note 
the use of crosses and the Star of David to mark burial sites.  
Suffice it to say that these cases illustrate the profound differences 
between Japan and industrial democracies in the West in historical 
experience and thus the forms of state action and constitutional issues that 
arise. Any meaningful comparison of constitutional adjudication that 
includes Japan must first take into account such fundamental contrasts of 
history and social context.  
The law-making structures of postwar Japan constitute a second 
category of factors relevant to analysis of judicial decision making in 
constitutional adjudication. In comparison with the principal states of 
Western Europe and the United States, the political structure of Japan is 
remarkably exceptional as a fully unitary parliamentary system. Only 
France, despite its hybrid presidential form of government, is comparable 
in terms of the law-making consequences. First, Japan lacks the inherent 
conflicts of federal or quasi-federal systems. No prefecture or local 
government has law-making functions as extensively shared with the 
national government as an American state, a German Land, an Italian or 
Spanish autonomous region, or even the regional governments of the 
United Kingdom. Absent in Japan as a result are a host of issues related to 
federalism and regional autonomy that prevail in comparable industrial 
democracies. Similarly, nationally supervised professional police forces 
and a national professional procuracy minimize, in relative terms, conflicts 
and constitutional litigation over issues of criminal law and procedure. By 
the same token, a nationally supervised system of public education, with a 
corps of educators equally subject to national standards, minimizes 
constitutional adjudication related to education. Also absent are the 
conflicts between the legislature and the executive of presidential and 
some quasi-presidential systems that require or induce judicial resolution 
(South Korea, for example).
30
 
Moreover, political structures, including the electoral system, have 
produced six decades of continuous center-right governance. No other 
industrial democracy has a comparable record of stable postwar 
governance. For constitutional litigation, the consequence is a dearth of 
legislation reflecting political extremes and a consequent dearth of 
constitutional challenges.  
 
 
 30. See, e.g., Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], May 14, 2004 (16-1 KCCR, 609) (Impeachment 
of the President (Roh Moo-hyun) Case), translated in 1 CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, 
CONSTITUTIONAL COURT DECISIONS 1998–2004, at 281 (2006).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol88/iss6/4
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The lack of contestable legislation and administrative regulation is due 
in part to another structural variant: the formal processes for drafting 
legislation and administrative regulations. The role of law-trained 
administrative officials, especially those selected to staff the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau, ensures that government-sponsored legislation and 
administrative regulations deemed by the Cabinet Legislation Bureau to be 
unconstitutional, at least facially, are rarely, if ever, enacted. Again, such a 
process of review is totally absent in the United States and may not even 
be structurally feasible in a presidential system. In Western Europe, only 
the French Council of State performs fully comparable functions.  
Features of Japan‘s political structure have led, however, to one of the 
most contentious sets of constitutional cases of the postwar era: repeated 
constitutional challenges to elections based on the malapportionment of 
seats for both the House of Representatives (Shugiin) and the House of 
Councillors (Sangiin). Electoral malapportionment has been almost as 
frequently litigated an issue as Article 9. The first case was the 1964 
Grand Bench decision in Koshiyama v. Chairman, Tokyo Metropolitan 
Election Supervision Commission, in which the Court for the first time 
held the issue to be justiciable under a provision for administrative 
(kokoku) appeals from decisions by election commissions under Article 
204 of Public Office Election Law, but determined that the apportionment 
among election districts of seats in the House of Councillors did not 
violate the constitutional guarantee of equality under Article 14(1), nor the 
provisions of Article 15(2), 43(1), and the proviso of Article 45, which 
collectively affirm that members of the Diet represent the ―whole 
community‖ ―without discrimination.‖31 The allocation of seats per district 
for House of Councillors elections had not been revised since initially 
determined in 1947
32
 and thus failed to take into account significant 
demographic changes and resulting disparities in the ratio of voters to 
allocated seats among electoral districts. The 1964 judgment did not fully 
discuss the extent of the disparity in the ratio of voters in the districts in 
question, but instead, in language echoing the Sunakawa decision on the 
limits of legislative discretion and reviewability (as noted by Justice Saitō 
Kitarō in his supplementary opinion), reasoned that  
 
 
 31. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 5, 1964, 18 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
270. 
 32. House of Councillors Law, Law No. 11 of 1947) (left unchanged in 1950 by the Public 
Offices Election Law, Law No. 100 of 1950). 
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except in a case in which the number of Diet members in an election 
district creates an extreme inequality in the voter‘s enjoyment of the 
right to elect, the percentage of seats apportioned to each district is a 
matter of legislative policy subject to the Diet‘s authority as the 
legislative branch.
33
  
In contrast, twelve years later, in the 1976 Kurokawa case, the Court 
concluded that the allocation of seats for the House of Representatives 
under the applicable election law did violate the Constitution.
34
 The Court 
did not overrule or reject its 1964 decision. Nor, notably, did it distinguish 
Koshiyama as a challenge to the election for the House of Councillors 
rather than the House of Representatives. Instead, it defined a 
constitutional standard as if applicable for elections for both chambers, 
emphasizing that, by the time of the challenged House of Representatives 
election in December 1972, the disparity among districts had ―without 
reasonable grounds‖ reached the point of extreme. The maximum number 
of voters per representative was nearly five times greater than the 
minimum number of voters.
35
 Moreover, in both decisions, a majority of 
the Court refused to invalidate the elections in contention, which had been 
held two years prior to the decision in the Koshiyama case and four years 
earlier in Kurokawa. Six Justices in Kurokawa did favor nullifying the 
election. One, Justice Amano Buichi, urged dismissal, arguing that Article 
204 of the Public Official Election Law should not be construed to provide 
for an administrative kokoku appeal from a decision by an election 
administration commission. He urged that precedents to the contrary, 
including Koshiyama, be overruled.  
Since Kurokawa, the Supreme Court has ruled on appeals involving 
similar challenges to separate national elections for the House of 
Representatives and the House of Councillors based on malapportionment 
of seats in at least eleven Grand Bench decisions.
36
 The patterns were the 
 
 
 33. English Translation of Koshiyama v. Chairman, Tokyo Metropolitan Election Supervision 
Comm‘n, in HIROSHI ITOH & LAWRENCE WARD BEER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE LAW OF JAPAN: 
SELECTED SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 1961–70, at 53, 54 (1978) (emphasis added).  
 34. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 14, 1976, Showa 79 [gyo-tsu] no. 75, 30 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 223 (Kurokawa v. Chiba Prefecture Election Comm’n). 
 35. Id., translated in Judgments of the Supreme Court, COURTS IN JAPAN, http://www.courts. 
go.jp/english/judgments/text/1976.04.14-1974-Gyo-Tsu-No.75.html (last visited May 10, 2011). 
 36. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 30, 2009, Heisei 20 [gyo-tsu] no. 209, 63 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1520 (Yamaguchi v. Tokyo Prefecture Election Comm’n) 
(House of Councillors election of 2007); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] June 13, 2007, 61 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1617 (Takemura v. Tokyo Prefecture Election Comm’n) 
(House of Representatives election of 2005); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 4, 2006, Heisei 17 [gyo-
tsu] no. 247, 60 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2696 (Yamaguchi v. Tokyo Prefecture 
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same. In each case, plaintiffs filed suit to have either a special or general 
election invalidated on the basis of the unconstitutionality of the allotment 
of seats to election districts under statutory law at the time of the 
challenged election. Most of the early cases took several years to reach the 
Supreme Court, and from one to two years for the Court to decide. For 
example, the contested election in Shimizu v. The Osaka Prefecture 
Election Commission occurred six years prior to the Grand Bench 
decision, and the election in the 2004 Yamaguchi v. Tokyo Prefecture 
Election Commission case was held nine years earlier. In each of the three 
cases decided since 2005, two years had elapsed between the election and 
the Supreme Court decision. Whatever the lapse of time, in the meantime, 
as is routine in a parliamentary system, governments had been formed, 
prime ministers selected, cabinet posts filled, government-sponsored 
legislation enacted, cabinet orders issued—the legal validity of all of 
which would be in question had the elections been invalidated by virtue of 
their constitutional defects. Moreover, since elections for the House of 
Representatives do not occur at prescribed times, the Diet could not, in 
any event, ensure that, prior to any election, shifts in population were 
accounted for in the distribution of seats by district. Some lag in the 
allocation of seats per district, with resulting disparities in ratio of voters 
per seat, was inevitable.  
Until the 1994 reform of the electoral system for the House of 
Representatives from multi-member single districts to single-member 
districts combined with proportional representation, the new Diet 
responded by adding seats to districts that were underrepresented, while 
reducing the number of seats in those that were overrepresented, until the 
 
 
Election Comm’n) (House of Councillors election of 2004); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 14, 2004, 
58 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 56 (Yamaguchi v. Tokyo Prefecture Election 
Comm’n) (House of Councillors election of 1995); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 10, 1999, Heisei 
11 [gyo-tsu] no. 35, 53 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1704 (Nonoyama v. Tokyo 
Prefecture Election Comm’n) (House of Councillors election of 1996); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] 
Sept. 2, 1998, Heisei 9 [gyo-tsu] no. 104, 52 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1373 
(Yamaguchi v. Tokyo Prefecture Election Comm’n) (House of Councillors election of 1995); Saikō 
Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 11, 1996, Heisei 6 [gyo-tsu] no. 59, 50 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI 
HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 2283 (Osaka Prefecture Election Comm’n v. Kawazoe) (House of Councillors 
election of 1992); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 20, 1993, Heisei 3 [gyo-tsu] no. 111, 47 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 67 (Kawano v. Tokyo Prefecture Election Comm’n) (House of 
Representatives election of 1990); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 17, 1985, Showa 59 [gyo-tsu] no. 
339, 39 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1100 (Kaneo v. Hiroshima Prefecture Election 
Comm’n) (House of Representatives election of 1983); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 7, 1983, 37 
SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1243 (Kamuta v. Tokyo Prefecture Election Comm’n) 
(House of Representatives election of 1980); Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 1983, Showa 54 
[gyo-tsu] no. 65, 37 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 345 (Shimizu v. Osaka Prefecture 
Election Comm’n) (House of Councillors election of 1977).  
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maximum number that could be accommodated was reached, by 
increasing the number of members (from 466 in 1948 to 480 today). In 
1994, the electoral system was reformed. Of the 480 total seats in the 
Lower House, 300 are elected from single-member constituencies, and 180 
are elected from eleven multi-member constituencies by a party-list 
system of proportional representation. The single-member districts are 
established on the basis of population. The initial districting measures had 
a maximum two-to-one disparity in the ratio of voters per representative.  
The electoral system for the House of Councillors was not changed in 
1994. The Upper House continued to comprise 252 members, elected for 
six-year terms. In the first major electoral reform under the postwar 
Constitution in 1982, two types of constituencies were established for 
upper house seats. First, a national "proportional representation" 
constituency, represented by 127 councillors, was introduced. Thirteen 
prefectural constituencies for the forty-seven prefectures and districts, 
apportioned according to the district populations, were also established. 
For the national constituency, voters do not select candidates as 
individuals, as had previously been the case, but instead cast ballots for 
parties. Individual councillors, listed officially by the parties before the 
election, are selected on the basis of the parties‘ proportions of the total 
national constituency vote. Between two and eight councillors are allotted 
by law to each of the thirteen prefectural constituencies. The allotments 
are based on the population of the districts. In 2000, the total number of 
seats in the House of Councillors was reduced to 242—with the 
elimination of six seats elected by individual constituencies and four by 
proportional representation. The 2000 revision of the Public Office 
Election Law,
37
 for the first time since 1947, also adjusted the number of 
seats per House of Councillors constituency. 
Prior to 1994, the fundamental issue of malapportionment was the 
same for both houses: significant disparities in the ratio of seats to the 
population in multimember lower and upper house electoral districts 
(constituencies). The solution was to add or to subtract seats to equalize 
the ratios. Adding seats was politically the easier to achieve, but this 
approach could continue only as long as the Diet could accommodate the 
additions. The alternative—to reduce the number of seats—was obviously 
a more difficult approach. Adding seats enabled new candidates. 
Subtracting seats put incumbents at risk. The creation of single-member 
districts for Lower House elections transformed the issue from the number 
 
 
 37. Law No. 118 of 2000. 
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of seats per district to the population of the district as defined by law—in 
other words, the issue became the politically more complex problem of 
defining the geographical boundaries of electoral districts rather than 
simply the number of representatives per district. However, for the Upper 
House, the problem remained how many seats to allocate to each 
constituency based on population. The underlying cause of the problem is, 
of course, continuous demographic change—particularly the growth of 
suburban areas and the transformation of less densely populated 
agricultural areas surrounding major cities into densely populated 
bedroom communities that improved mass transit and the automobile have 
enabled. 
The first major case following the Kurokawa decision was Shimizu v. 
Osaka Prefecture Election Commission.
38
 The petitioners in the case had 
challenged the July 1977 election of members of the House of Councillors 
on the grounds that the number of seats allotted to the prefectural 
constituencies, both prior to and after the 1982 reform, violated the 
provisions related to election of members of the Diet of Articles 14(1), 
15(2), 43(1), and 44 of the Constitution. At the time of the election, the 
disparity in the ratio of voters per member of the House of Councillors to 
be elected among the electoral districts had reached 1 to 5.26, exceeding 
the disparity determined to be unconstitutional in Kurokawa. Moreover, 
some less populated constituencies were allotted more seats than others 
with a larger population—the ―reverse phenomena.‖ By a thirteen-to-two 
majority, the Court dismissed the appeal in April 1983, affirming a 1979 
decision by the Osaka High Court that the apportionment of seats at issue 
did not violate the Constitution. In the decision, the Court distinguished 
the House of Councillors from the House of Representatives. Standards for 
the equality among voters necessarily differed between the two houses. 
The eight-Justice majority then noted: 
[T]he apportionment provision should be held unconstitutional only 
when the change of population brings forth such excessive 
inequality of the weight of each vote as might be regarded 
unjustifiable in the light of the importance of equality of the weight 
of each vote under the mechanics of election, and when the 
inequality has continued for a long period and therefore, when it is 
judged to be beyond the permissible limit that no countermeasures 
for the inequality are taken even if it is taken into account that it 
 
 
 38. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 27, 1983, Showa 54 [gyo-tsu] no. 65, 37 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 345. 
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depends on the discretionary power of the Diet exercised based on 
complex and highly political consideration and judgment.
39
  
Five Justices wrote or joined concurring opinions (Justice Masami Ito, 
joined by Justice Goichi Miyazaki, Justice Susumu Ohashi, Justice Daizo 
Yokoi, and Justice Masataka Taniguchi). Only two dissented (Justice 
Shigemitsu Dando and Justice Masato Fujisaki). Emphasizing the failure 
of the Diet to adjust the number of seats per electoral district for the House 
of Councillors for twenty-seven years despite major changes in 
population, Justice Dando concluded: 
I cannot but recognize that the apportionment provision at issue was 
as a whole unconstitutional at the time of the election at issue. 
However, further consideration is needed to decide how it will 
affect the validity of the election at issue. I, as a member of the 
court who participated in the grand bench judgment of 1976, avail 
myself of the gist of the reasoning of the judgment as it is. 
Therefore, I think that in this case the judgment of the court below 
should be altered to dismiss the demand of the Appellants and to 
declare in the main text that the election at issue is illegal.
40
  
Meanwhile, a related case was being adjudicated in the Tokyo High 
Court. In that action, the constitutionality of the apportionment of seats to 
electoral districts for members of the House of Representatives was at 
issue with a petition for invalidation of the 1980 House of Representatives 
general election. In a November 1983 judgment in Kamuta v. Tokyo 
Prefecture Election Commission,
41
 the Supreme Court reaffirmed the 
Kurokawa decision. The Court unanimously held that the apportionment 
of seats in the electoral districts was unconstitutional at the time of the 
election but refused to invalidate the election itself.  
Only two of the subsequent cases—Kaneo v. Hiroshima Prefecture 
Election Commission
42
 and Yamaguchi v. Tokyo Prefecture Election 
Commission
43—followed Kurokawa in finding that, at the time of the 
election at issue, the maximum disparity in the ratio of seats allocated per 
 
 
 39. Id., translated in Judgments of the Supreme Court, COURTS IN JAPAN, http://www.courts.go. 
jp/english/judgments/text/1983.04.27-1979-Gyo-Tsu-No.65-154836.html (last visited May 10, 2011). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Nov. 7, 1983, 37 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1243. 
 42. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 17, 1985, Showa 59 [gyo-tsu] no. 339, 39 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1100. 
 43. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 2, 1998, Heisei 9 [gyo-tsu] no. 104, 52 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO 
MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 1373.  
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voter among districts was constitutionally impermissible.
44
 All, however, 
have adhered to Kurokawa‘s denial of relief. No election has yet been 
invalidated. To do so within a parliamentary system would at least call 
into question the governments that had been formed thereafter and all 
legislation and cabinet actions thereunder, thereby creating a political and 
legal crisis of extraordinary proportions.  
Few, if any, constitutional courts in any country, I submit, would be 
willing to impose such legal, political, social, and economic costs on their 
national communities notwithstanding apparent constitutional mandates.
45
 
Wise and politically neutral judges are highly reluctant to venture into 
such partisan political thickets. The Justices of Japan‘s Supreme Court 
should thus hardly be deemed exceptionally ―conservative‖ in their efforts 
to promote compliance with constitutional ideals while maintaining a 
stable political order. Their approach has been didactic—to instruct the 
legislature to make necessary changes in the allocation of seats to redress 
the problem. Failure to do this inexorably produces extreme frustration 
among the Justices, resulting in cases like its 2009 decision in Yamaguchi 
v. Tokyo Prefecture Election Commission,
46
 in which a majority of nine 
Justices (five dissenting) openly admonished the legislature for its failures 
and, by their numbers, increasingly threaten to return to Kurokawa with 
the possibility of a more drastic declaration. 
The palatable frustration of the Justices in recent malapportionment 
cases evidences the independence of the judiciary from any overdeference 
to the Diet or the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. The problem for the 
Justices, including those in dissent, is not overdeference to the Diet, but 
rather the limits of judicial capacity. As the malapportionment decisions 
demonstrate, equally significant for constitutional decision making is a 
third category of factors—the structure and shared values of the judiciary.  
Missing from many comparative analyses of constitutional adjudication 
is an appraisal of the often unstated premises related to judicial authority 
and competence. Concepts of judicial jurisdiction and the authority of 
judges over the parties—and, in common law jurisdictions, the ―thing‖ 
(res)—differ fundamentally in common law as compared to civil law 
systems. Unlike their continental European and Japanese counterparts, 
 
 
 44. The Court in its 1998 decision in Yamaguchi v. Tokyo Prefecture Election Commission 
refrained, however, from formally holding the legislative action to be unconstitutional in light of 
subsequent efforts to reduce the disparity. 
 45. See, e.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Bush v. Gore, 
531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 46. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 30, 2009, Heisei 20 [gyo-tsu] no. 209, 63 SAIKŌ 
SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHŪ [KEISHŪ] 203. 
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common law judges, for example, have broad authority over the parties 
that may continue, as typical in family matters, beyond the particular 
action they have adjudicated. Thus, they exercise continuing jurisdiction to 
ensure compliance with their decrees. Without such broad jurisdictional 
authority, at least until recently, Japanese judges have avoided awarding 
continuous payments over time, such as alimony or child support.  
Jurisdiction in civil law systems, in contrast, is conceived of in terms of 
the subject matter of the case with the allocation of the appropriate court—
what in common law jurisdictions is generally conceived of as venue—is 
determined by the defendant‘s domicile and not by presence or, for that 
matter, where he is ―seized‖ by service. Common law judges also exercise 
coercive powers through contempt. It is almost unthinkable in Japan and 
continental Europe to have police in regular attendance at court in family 
and civil cases, ready at the presiding judge‘s command to shackle and 
imprison anyone in the courtroom judicially deemed to be in contempt of 
court. Thus, among the often unstated premises of the malapportionment 
cases are limitations on what the courts can legally do that simply do not 
apply in the United States or other common law systems. Because the 
authority of the courts is limited to the adjudication and review of 
justiciable cases, they cannot adjudicate ex ante, before the elections and 
some administrative action against which the petitioners may lodge an 
appeal have taken place. The Court‘s 1964 decision in the Koshiyama case 
is most significant for construing Article 204 of the Public Offices 
Election Law to allow appeals from certifications by election commission 
officials in which the constitutionality of the election itself could be 
challenged. This was, as noted, a landmark holding that for the first time 
enabled the courts to adjudicate such claims. Nor do the judges have the 
authority to declare an election prospectively invalid and then proceed 
directly to oversee corrective legislative proposals. In constitutional 
adjudication, they are limited to ex post adjudication and review of 
petitions claiming particular, past infringements of constitutional rights. 
Moreover, in many, if not most, of the cases, the allocations had been 
revised by the time of the decision. Thus, the Court was reviewing seat 
allotments or district configurations that had already been changed by the 
time of the decision.  
One potential consequence in cases like the malapportionment ones 
may ultimately be some sort of finagling, such as suggested by Justice 
Tahara in his dissent in the 2009 decision in Yamaguchi v. Tokyo 
Prefecture Election Commission, to declare the election illegal but not to 
invalidate it. Only by the creation of special constitutional courts, with 
expressly legislated competence to render advisory opinions or to retain 
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authority over cases and the like, have other civil law jurisdictions 
managed to deal with what to a common law judge would be surely 
viewed as remarkable limitations of judicial authority and power in 
constitutional adjudication. 
Critics are correct, however, to assert that structural features for the 
appointment of both Supreme Court Justices as well as career judges foster 
political accountability. Such was the intention of the American drafters of 
the postwar Constitution and system for career judicial appointment. 
Indeed, Kades, chairing the committee assigned the task of writing a 
model constitution for Japan, personally insisted that judges be subject, as 
in the United States, to political appointment.
47
 Formally, therefore, all 
career judges are appointed by the Cabinet—first their initial appointment 
as assistant judges and subsequently, ten years later, their appointment as 
full judges. Judges are by law denied the privilege of partisan political 
identification. They can belong to no party or political faction. Quite 
properly, knowledgeable critics ignore such structural features by at least 
tacit acknowledgment that postwar cabinets have routinely approved for 
appointment and promotion judges on lists prepared and submitted by the 
Personnel Office of the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court, which 
itself is staffed by senior career judges. In view of this structure, those who 
question the political independence of the courts neglect the more 
interesting issue of why the judiciary is not more politically influenced. 
Values, as well as institutional design, matter. Deference to those who 
govern politically does not determine the ―conservatism‖ of the Japanese 
judiciary. First and foremost, judges—both the career judges who staff all 
of the lower courts as well as the Justices of the Supreme Court—share, as 
noted, the most widely held values of the Japanese population. They too 
function within the same historical and social contexts as other members 
of the society. History and shared experience similarly shape their values 
and beliefs. Individual political ideologies surely differ, but it would be 
remarkable for career judges generally to be less or more ―center-right‖ in 
their personal predilections than the Japanese electorate as a whole.  
Judges also acquire, over the course of their careers, values that are 
more particular to their office. The adjudication of constitutional cases 
with merit that do reach the courts requires judges in all legal systems to 
make determinations of fact, law, and values. The perceived fairness and 
sensibility of outcomes are significant for judicial decision making in all 
 
 
 47. See 1 TAKAYANAGI KENZŌ, OHTOMO ICHIRŌ & TANAKA HIDEO, NIHON KOKU KEMPŌ SEITEI 
NO KATEI (THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF JAPAN), at xx (1972). 
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developed legal systems. Few, if any, judges in any legal system are likely 
to hand down decisions that, given the facts, they believe are dictated by 
legal rules or principles but, in their view and by their values, are unjust 
and contrary to common sense. Experienced advocates understand this 
truism and will make every effort to present cases for decision in which 
the alleged facts and applicable law lead to fair and sensible decisions that 
favor their clients. For career judges in Japan, shared judicial values are 
also created and reinforced by the organization of a community of judges 
as a carefully selected, nurtured, and monitored national corps. Senior 
judges—as administrators in the personnel office of the General 
Secretariat, as colleagues on the bench in all courts at all levels, and even 
as neighbors in specially provided housing complexes—are involved at all 
stages and in nearly all facets of a judge‘s career. No judiciary has such 
continuing and intense nurturing and oversight, or comparable means of 
instilling a particularized judicial ethos or set of judicial values.
48
  
Among the most salient of these judicial values is concern for 
consistency and predictability. Such concern further buttresses a notable 
adherence to precedent as a fundamental feature of the legal system. In all 
fields of law, decisions by the highest court, including century-old 
decisions of the Dai-shin’in, are routinely followed or carefully 
distinguished. They are seldom, if ever, overruled. The decision in Aizawa 
v. Japan,
49
 holding unconstitutional the provision for more severe 
penalties for the murder of a lineal ascendant under Article 200 of the 
Criminal Code, is a prominent example. The Court in Aizawa pointedly 
declined to overrule its 1952 decision in Japan v. Yamato,
50
 in which it 
upheld a similar provision for enhanced penalties for the crime of 
inflicting bodily injury resulting in death of Article 205, despite obvious 
inconsistency in both outcome and rationale.
51
 From contract to criminal 
 
 
 48. See John O. Haley, The Japanese Judiciary: Maintaining Integrity, Autonomy, and the Public 
Trust, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT 99 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007). 
 49. See supra note 12. 
 50. Saikō Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Oct. 11, 1952, 4 SAIKŌ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHŪ [MINSHŪ] 
1520. 
 51. In contrast, in 2002, the Korean Constitutional Court upheld a similar provision in the South 
Korean Criminal Code on the grounds that the provision for a more severe penalty for causing the 
death of a lineal ascendant was justified in that such a crime is ―contrary to the universal social order, 
and morality.‖ Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2000Hun-Ba53, March 28, 2002 (9 14-1 KCCR, 159) 
(S. Kor.) (Manslaughter of a Lineal Ascendant of the Offender or His Spouse Resulting from Bodily 
Injury Case), reprinted in 1 THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF KOREA, CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
DECISIONS 882 (2006), available at http://www.ccourt.go.kr (last visited May 10, 2011). In 1995, the 
Diet finally amended the Criminal Code to abolish the disparity in penalties for crimes against lineal 
ascendants. 
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law, the continuity of legal rules and principles articulated by the highest 
court is extraordinary.
52
  
The reluctance of the Court in Aizawa to overrule its 1952 decision was 
not exceptional. In the two other landmark cases of the 1970s—the 1975 
Pharmacy Licensing case (Sumiyoshi) and the 1976 Kurokawa 
malapportionment decision—the Court simply ignored or distinguished 
decades-old precedents. In Sumiyoshi, the Court did not mention its 1955 
Grand Bench decision in the Bathhouse case,
53
 in which the Court rejected 
a similar challenge under Article 22 to the location standards established 
pursuant to a licensing statute for bathhouses, notwithstanding inconsistent 
reasoning as well as result. The headnote to the case in the official 
commentary (authored presumably by the chōsakan assigned to the case) 
does, however, note that the 1955 decision was effectively reversed.
54
 
Kurokawa, as discussed above, was more ambivalent with respect to 
precedent. In outcome on the constitutional issues, Kurokawa is arguably 
inconsistent with Koshiyama. However, the Court did not explicitly reject 
its 1964 Grand Bench decision but rather provided grounds for 
distinguishing it. Nonetheless, the subsequent Grand Bench decisions—all 
of which, as noted, have rejected the Kurokawa outcome and appear, at 
least in result, to be more in line with Koshiyama—cite Kurokawa, not 
Koshiyama, as controlling precedent.  
For career judges, including those Supreme Court Justices appointed to 
the highest court upon or soon after their retirement, legal consistency and 
predictability are primary values. As explained by a senior judge currently 
on the Tokyo High Court:  
career judges tend to formulate conservative opinions that maintain 
and preserve the law (hōshū-teki keikō); as such, career judges do 
not favor radical opinions, and tend to prefer decisions that protect 
precedents and judicial order. In short, career-judge justices do not 
generally try to create decisions that greatly alter the society.
55
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Only Grand Bench decisions are explicitly, by law, binding on all 
courts.
56
 Nonetheless, career judges who ignore even Supreme Court Petty 
Bench decisions put their careers at risk.
57
 
Grand Bench decisions remain infrequent. Most cases that reach the 
Supreme Court today are adjudicated by one of the three five-member 
petty benches. These panels, like the Court as a whole, are dominated by 
former career judges. The fifteen-Justice Court generally comprises no 
fewer than five (usually six) former career judges, two to three retired 
prosecutors, up to five practicing lawyers, usually one Justice appointed 
from a leading law faculty, and one or two former administrative officials, 
predominately from the ranks of those who had served on the Cabinet 
Legislation Bureau. Because the average age of justices upon appointment 
hovers around sixty-four, and retirement is mandatory at seventy, few 
Justices ever serve longer than eight or nine years. Turnover is 
consequentially frequent. For example, no Justice on the Court today has 
served longer than five years. The current Justices include five former 
career judges, all of whom served much of their careers in the General 
Secretariat. Both the Chief Justice (Takesaki Hironobu) and the most 
recently appointed Justice (Otani Takehiko) had served as General 
Secretary of the Supreme Court, the highest administrative position of the 
judiciary. Also recently appointed (April 2010) is Justice Okabe Kiyoko. 
She is one of two women—the third ever to serve on the Court—and, at 
sixty-one years of age, the youngest. Justice Okabe is also exceptional in 
that she served as a career judge for seventeen years (1976–93), registered 
as a lawyer and presumably engaged in practice for about four years 
(1993–97), and then began a third career as a Professor of Law at Toyo 
University (1997–2007). In 2007, she joined the Keio Law School faculty. 
Of the nine remaining Justices, four were practicing lawyers (three in 
Tokyo, one in Osaka), two former prosecutors, one former diplomat 
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs), and one—the second woman on the Court—
a Ministry of Labor official. In other words, only four Justices born after 
the end of World War II—all recent appointees—have ever served on the 
Court. 
The backgrounds of the Justices also matter. Career judges, especially 
those who have had primary responsibility for the administration of the 
judiciary, bring to the Court a set of values related to judicial decision 
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making appropriately described as ―conservative‖ in their emphasis on 
decisional stability and adherence to precedent. Rarely, if ever, does the 
Court explicitly overrule a prior constitutional decision. Rather, as 
illustrated by a series of constitutional decisions decided in the 1970s 
ranging from electoral malapportionment to the killing of a lineal 
ascendant, the Court ignores or merely distinguishes apparently 
inconsistent prior decisions of a decade earlier. The lawyers on the Court 
are considered to form the most progressive bloc, but as elite members of 
the bar who have all held prominent bar association offices and have 
served on various government commissions, they too share values labeled 
politically ―conservative‖ by most observers.  
Another group of career judges are also influential. These are the 
chōsakan, the thirty-seven research judges selected from the most highly 
regarded and credentialed career judges to serve for a term of years to 
assist the Justices. Seventeen are assigned to civil cases, nine to 
administrative cases, and nine to criminal cases. They conduct research 
and make recommendations. The Justices need not adhere to the 
conclusions reached or the outcomes suggested, but their influence is 
apparent in the summaries of the cases they write and publish as official 
commentary on each significant decision. Three of the five (or six) career 
judges on the Court today are former chōsakan. 
Almost by definition, constitutional adjudication requires more than 
simply an analysis of constitutional language and the relevant legal issues. 
Were judicial decision making in constitutional cases merely a matter of 
construing language in some formalistic fashion, the task in most cases 
could, and perhaps should, be properly left to career judges. Constitutional 
adjudication, however, differs in that the decisions commonly involve 
basic questions of policy and judicial choice for which formal legal 
analysis and statutory construction often provide little help.  
The decision of whether the Constitution allows an illegitimate child to 
receive only half of the mandated child‘s inheritance portion under the 
Civil Code (legitim) can hardly be determined by the language of the 
Constitution alone. Nor in cases involving the provisions of codes can 
courts simply defer to the wisdom of the legislators who enacted them, in 
most instances over a century ago in a social context that has drastically 
changed. Constitutional adjudication in all legal systems involves often 
unstated assumptions of the judges themselves as to their appropriate role, 
as well as the standards for selecting the most appropriate outcomes. 
Judges in deciding at least the contentious ―hard‖ cases necessarily 
transform the ―ought to be‖ to the ―is‖ of law.  
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The standards used by Justices—both to define their appropriate role as 
well as to reach the most appropriate outcome—differ, and more often 
than not remain implicit. Judges and Justices seem to agree, however, that 
reaching a ―sensible‖ decision is paramount. As expressed by former 
Justice and Tohoku University law professor Fujita Tokiyasu in a recent 
interview for the Hōsō University: 
[T]he question that begs to be asked is why do we need the Supreme 
Court if the legal issues are resolved at the High Court level? The 
answer is that the Supreme Court is expected to provide the highest 
form of ―common sense‖ (saido na jōshiki). For example, if there is 
a split among two high courts, it signifies that—on the highest 
level—both decisions are [legally] acceptable. In such instances it is 
jōshiki that determines what the right decision truly is.58 
Justice Fujita concedes that what ―makes sense‖ to one judge or Justice 
may not for another. In his words, ―the meaning of this jōshiki can (or 
perhaps, may be) different depending on the type of career path a Justice 
had formerly treaded.‖59 
Tokyo High Court Judge Inoue Shigeki seconds such views. Judges in 
practice, he believes, rely on their ―sixth‖ sense of the appropriate 
outcome, a perception or ―feeling‖ (kan) based on their backgrounds as 
career judges, lawyers, prosecutors, legal scholars, or administrative 
officials. In his words, ―Justices then will try to formulate their decisions 
in ways that parallel the ‗sense of society‘ (shakai tsūnen).‖ 
Indeed, the phrase ―sense of society‖ (shakai tsūnen) has long been the 
most commonly used rationale for judicial decisions. Scholars both within 
and outside of Japan have long questioned what it means,
60
 whether judges 
merely use the phrase to justify decisions based principally on their 
personal preferences or whether reliance on their collective perceptions of 
the ―sense of society‖ represents an analytically meaningful effort to reach 
decisions that are compatible at least with the judge‘s ―sense‖ of 
community preference and consensus. Whatever their implicit motivation, 
in any event, judges do not explicitly define their role in choosing or 
determining what is the best or most appropriate outcome with rationales 
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based on their view of the most ―reasonable‖ or morally appropriate 
outcome.  
In conclusion, in my view, judges in Japan share the prevailing 
communitarian orientation of their society, an orientation that rejects 
Manichean choices and moral or ―scientific‖ absolutes, but instead relies 
on their collective and individual perceptions of community values—
including the global community—shared by peers. They also, I believe, 
accept an unstated premise that legislative and administrative decisions 
reflect a consensus among the participants—not a simple majority. The 
issue remains as to who participates—who sits at the table—but the 
political and administrative processes do not routinely require merely 
fifty-one out of a hundred votes. As a consequence, judges are cautiously 
conservative. They adhere to precedent and endeavor to maintain, as best 
they can in a changing society, a legal order that is predictable and 
consistent. Stability is a virtue, not a vice. They do not seek to be the 
catalysts of social change. They believe in democratic institutions and thus 
defer to the democratic institutions of governance while maintaining, 
indeed reinforcing in their priority of values, the rule of law.  
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